DEFENDING FLORIDA EMPLOYERS: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s religion.” Title VII defines religion as follows: “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Under Title VII, an employer therefore has a “statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the religious observances of its employee, short of incurring an undue hardship.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale employment attorney, who defends businesses and their owners against employment law claims, and represents clients in business litigation in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach. Such claims include alleged employment discrimination and retaliation as well as claims for overtime wages and other related claims.

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first “present evidence sufficient to prove that (1) he had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his employer of his belief; and (3) he was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1994). The burden then shifts to the defendant to “demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42. U.S.C. § 2000e. This is a two-prong inquiry.

“To satisfy its burden, the employer must demonstrate either (1) that it provided the plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for his or her religious observances or (2) that such accommodation was not provided because it would have caused an undue hardship – that is, it would have ‘result[ed] in more than a de minimis cost to the employer.’” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008). “Thus, if an employer has provided a reasonable accommodation, [the court] need not examine whether alternative accommodations not offered would have resulted in undue hardship.” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008).

The phrase “reasonably accommodate” is “not defined within the language of Title VII.” Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1994). As a result, “the precise reach of the employer’s obligation to its employee is unclear under the statute and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has explained that a reasonable accommodation is one that “eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.” Ansonia Bd. of Edu. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (2012).

Moreover, courts have held that “[a]n accommodation is reasonable as a matter of law, if it in fact eliminates a religious conflict in the workplace; accordingly, if the conflict is eliminated the employee has no right to insist upon a different accommodation that he prefers. Telfair v. Federal Exp. Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2013). “On the either hand, an accommodation is not unreasonable as a matter of law simply because it fails to eliminate all possible conflicts between employment requirements and the employee’s religion.” Telfair v. Federal Exp. Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2013).

While the issue of whether the employer provided a reasonable accommodation is determined on a case-by-case basis, “[i]t is well established that Title VII does not require an employer to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, especially provisions pertaining to seniority-based scheduling.” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court held that it “would be anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employee, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.” 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Hardison ultimately held that the employer was not liable under Title VII for terminating the employment of an employee whose religious beliefs prevented him from working on Saturdays when the only reasonable accommodation it could have provided would have been “at the expense of others who had strong, but perhaps nonreligious, reasonable for not working on weekends[.]” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Depending on the facts of the case, “an employer may be able to satisfy the requirements of Title VII by permitting an employee to swap shifts with other employees in the context of a neutral rotating shift system.” Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, 506 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).

An employer, however, is not required to accommodate at all costs. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that “compliance with Title VII does not require an employer to give an employee a choice among several accommodations; nor is the employer required to demonstrate that alternative accommodations proposed by the employee constitute undue hardship. . . . Rather, the inquiry ends when an employer shows that a reasonable accommodation was afforded the employee, regardless of whether that accommodation is one which the employee suggested.” Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, “so long as the employer has offered a reasonable accommodation, it has fulfilled its duty under Title VII.” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008).

Peter Mavrick is a Fort Lauderdale employment lawyer, and represents clients in Miami, Boca Raton, and Palm Beach. This article does not serve as a substitute for legal advice tailored to a particular situation.